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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROPERTY §17.2 . . . . 1, 11, 12 
Appellant Edward Loosli petitions the Court for rehearing of 
the Opinion filed herein on March 16, 1993 ("Slip Opinion" herein), 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
Petitioner submits that none of the issues submitted for 
review in Brief of Appellant were ruled upon or decided by the 
Slip Opinion. The issues thus unresolved are: 
1. Whether the Utah Landowner Liability Act preserves 
liability of a landowner who willfully fails to guard or warn 
against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity or if it 
eliminates any and all liability of a landowner who invites public 
use, in the event of injuries to recreational users. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by denying jury trial on 
factual questions concerning whether there was a willful failure 
to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or 
activity. 
3. Whether it was error for the trial court to deny jury 
trial on a parallel claim based upon Restatement (Second) Property 
§17.2 defining a duty to guard or warn against unreasonable risks 
to others when a landowner leases property for purposes involving 
use by the public. 
4. Whether it was error for the trial court to strike 
Plaintiff's showing, in the manner provided by Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, of disputed material facts on the theory that 
the showing does not constitute "evidence." 
5. Whether the trial court erred by ruling on causation as a 
matter of law. 
Instead of deciding any of the foregoing issues, the Slip 
Opinion dwells on whether the Act applies, which is not an issue 
because we conceded at Brief of Appellant 15-16, and 25 that the 
Act does apply. Thus the Opinion fails to decide, or even 
acknowledge, the error of the trial court in holding that the Act 
eliminates any and all liability. The Opinion also fails to 
decide, or even acknowledge, whether the trial court erred by 
taking clear factual questions from determination of a jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from summary judgment holding that the Utah 
Limitation of Landowner Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1, 
et seg. (the "Act" herein), relieved Defendant-Appellee 
Kennecott Copper Corporation ("Kennecott" herein) of any and all 
liability as a landowner for injuries to a recreational user of 
its property and refusing Plaintiff-Appellant Edward "Ted" Loosli 
("Loosli" herein) jury trial on his allegations of willful failure 
to guard or warn of dangerous conditions or structures on the 
property, within the meaning and intent of (1) the exception from 
the limit of liability at Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-6, and/or (2) the 
liability of a lessor of land who leases for a purpose involving 
admission of the public to guard or warn against unreasonable 
risks of harm to foreseeable users under the lease. 
Loosli suffered a broken spine, paralyzing him from the neck 
down, while riding an off-road vehicle, or ATV, on property owned 
- 2 -
by Defendant-Appellee Kennecott Copper Corporation where there 
were posts and timbers protruding above the ground alleged to be 
inherently dangerous for ATV travel. The land had been leased to 
the State of Utah for public use an an ATV park. The facts are 
stated in further detail at Brief of Appellant. 
The trial court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, 
presiding, entered summary judgment for Kennecott, denied the 
cross-motion of Loosli and denied jury trial on the question of 
whether Kennecott willfully failed to guard or warn of any danger-
ous condition or structure on the property. 
This Court affirmed in the Slip Opinion dated March 16, 1993, 
but failed to address the question of the nature and scope of 
liability in cases where recreational use is invited, which is 
first impression under the Act, or the trial court'& holding that 
the Act eliminated any and all liability. 
ARGUMENT 
The burden of the Slip Opinion is confined to holding that 
"the meaning of 'willful or malicious' set forth in [Utah Code 
Ann.] Section 57-14-6 involves the tripartite standard defined in 
Golding [v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1990)]" (Slip Opinion, p. 4), although the holding in Golding 
was never in serious dispute. The Slip Opinion merely holds that 
Loosli's showing in opposition to summary judgment was not 
"sufficient to create an underlying issue of material fact as to 
Kennecott's knowledge or lack thereof9" without ever acknowledging 
that Loosli had demanded a jury or explaining, in face of the jury 
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demand, how any factual issue could be resolved by the trial 
judge, or by this Court. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT, AND THIS COURT, ERR BY 
REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACT 
PRESERVES "LIMITED" LIABILITY 
The Slip Opinion correctly recites at p. 4 that the Act's 
limit of liability is "[e]xcept as specifically provided in 
Subsection (1) of Section 57-14-6" and that said Section 6 pre-
serves liability for a "willful or malicious failure to guard or 
warn . . . ." Inexplicably, the Slip Opinion then fails to give 
any effect to those provisions. 
A. The Trial Court's Finding of "No Liability" Must Be Reversed, 
It is therefore patent error that the Slip Opinion fails to 
address the point that the trial judge unequivocally ruled that 
the Landowners Liability Act eliminates all liability. Conclusion 
of Law No. 7 at p. 9 of the trial court's rulings (attached hereto 
as an appendix) was as follows: 
7. Kennecott had no duty of care to keep 
the premises safe for entry by Plaintiff or to 
give any warning of a dangerous conditon, use 
structure, or activity on its premises to 
plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) 
It is therefore sham, and misses the point of Loosli's appeal 
entirely, to address the meaning of the term "willful and 
malicious" under Utah Code Ann. §57-14-6(1) at Slip Opinion p. 4. 
The trial court plainly held that the Landowner's Liability Act 
eliminates any and all liability and that Kennecott has no 
liability. Loosli was given no opportunity to prove that 
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Kennecott violated the willful or malicious standard, however it 
may be defined. 
The trial court ruled that the Act's declaration at Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-14-3 that "an owner of land owes no duty of care" had 
the effect of releasing Kennecott from any and all liability. The 
error in that ruling, never addressed by the Slip Opinion, is that 
the Act does not create a blanket release of the duty of care 
simply by virtue of a landowner making his land available for 
recreational use. The Act provides only for a limit of 
liability. It is entitled "Limitation of Landowner Liabilities" 
(emphasis added) and both Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-14-3 and 4 declare 
the limitation to be "except as specifically provided in 
Subsection (1) of Section 57-14-6," providing as follows: 
Liability not limited where willful or malicious 
conduct involved or admission fee charged. 
(1) Nothing in this act shall limit any 
liability which otherwise exists for: 
(a) willful or malicious failure to guard 
or warn against a dangerous condition, use, 
structure, or activity; 
(b) deliberate, willful, or malicious 
injury to persons or property. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Slip Opinion thus fails to address, and reverse the error 
of Conclusion of Law No. 7 that "Kennecott had no duty of care to 
keep the premises safe for entry by Plaintiff or to give any 
warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity." 
That Conclusion is contrary to the plain provisions of Section 6. 
The well-established duty under tort law to guard or warn against 
any dangerous condition, use or structure carefully defined by 
this Court in e.g., Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah 
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App., 1991), is unambiguously one of the liabilities "which 
otherwise exist" which Section 6 refers to. That duty is clearly 
preserved, even if the standard of care is reduced by the term 
"willful." 
This Court plainly denied Loosli any appeal, or rendered the 
appeal process a sham and delusion, by failing to reverse the 
plain error of the trial court in that regard. 
B. The "Tripartite Standard" Requires Proof of Facts. 
Recitation at Slip Opinion 4 of the "tripartite stardard" of 
Colding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 900 
(Utah 1990) is meaningless, in context, and ignores the point of 
this appeal. 
We have never disputed the holding of Golding* We have 
advised this Court that Golding, and the only other cases 
construing the Act, Crawford v„ Tilley, 780 P.2d 1248 (Utah 
1989) and Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991) 
deal with trespassers or others who were not invited to make 
recreational use of the land. The question of this appeal, by 
contrast, is what standards apply to one who is invited to make 
recreational use. That question involves the three stage analysis 
of (1) determining if the Act applies (viz., if there was an 
invitation to others to make recreational use, which is admitted 
herein), (2) whether there was a willful failure to guard or warn 
of a dangerous conditon and (3) if not, what the "limit" of 
liability then shall be. The latter two points of the analysis 
have never been addressed by this or any other court. They were 
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exhaustively examined in Brief of Appellant but are ignored by the 
Slip Opinion and remain for decision. 
The Supreme Court plainly held in Golding that "the 
pleadings are insufficient to demonstrate that the Act's 
protections are available to the irrigation company" because "the 
complaint did not adequately allege a 'willful or malicious 
failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition'" and 
remanded on that issue. Thus Golding never reached, other than 
by dicta, the second stage of the analysis, viz., whether the 
standard was violated, involving factual questions as to which 
Loosli cannot be denied jury trial. 
Loosli, by contrast, squarely alleged at paragraph 6 of the 
Amended Complaint that 
Kennecott was aware of and willfully failed to 
guard or warn members of the public, including 
Loosli, against dangerous conditions existing 
on the Lark Sand Dunes, including the existence 
of scores and perhaps hundreds of posts, pro-
jections, timbers and structures, many of which 
were concealed or partially concealed and which 
were the remains of abandoned mining or process-
ing facilities of Kennecott and which made the 
operation of off-road vehicles thereon, ATVs in 
particular, dangerous, particularly to persons 
unfamiliar with the operation of off-road vehic-
les or unaware of said dangerous conditions and 
willfully failed to guard or warn Loosli and 
members of the public of the dangers of the 
activity of operating off-road vehicles, ATVs 
in particular, under conditions and hazards 
such as were present at the Lark Sand Dunes, 
within the meaning and intent of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-14-6(1)(a). 
In this case, the question is whether the Act's limitation of 
liability has any effect if there was a "willful failure to warn 
against a dangerous condition [or] structure" as contemplated by 
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Section 6. That question is not answered by Golding because the 
holding there was that the Act did not apply. The presence of a 
condition or structure and Kennecott's failure to guard or warn 
were agreed, and in fact acknowledged at Slip Opinion p. 2, but 
whether it was dangerous remained disputed. This Court cannot 
rule on that question as a matter of law until such time as the 
facts are determined by a jury. 
Kennecott led the trial court into error by urging that the 
Act simply means that a landowner no longer owes any "duty of 
care" and that "the plain meaning of the Act affords landowners 
who fall under its rubric full protection from liability." 
(Emphasis added.) That conclusion was adopted by the trial court 
and emasculates the exceptions of Section 6. That conclusion also 
fails to give effect to the words "nothing in this act shall limit 
any liability which otherwise exists" in the preamble to Section 6 
or to recognize the implications of those common law concepts. 
The Slip Opinion fails to address those errors of law. 
This Court has adopted the trial court's conclusion never 
examining what the standard is under Section 6 in circumstances 
where the Act does apply. 
POINT II 
THE SLIP OPINION IMPROPERLY DENIED JURY TRIAL 
ON FACTUAL ISSUES 
Slip Opinion p. 2 concedes that "the property had timbers 
protruding from the sand, which apparently constituted remains of 
an abandoned mill" and at Slip Opinion 6 that "in the opinion of 
• . . an accident reconstruction expert, Loosli's accident was 
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caused by the right rear wheel of the ATV striking an object on 
the ground," It was nevertheless concluded that "Loosli failed to 
present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact as to Kennecott's knowledge or lack thereof." The Slip 
Opinion thus commits plain error by indulging in weighing the 
evidence. 
Those rulings of the Slip Opinion mirror Finding of Fact Nos. 
11 and 12 at pp. 7-8 of the trial court (see Appendix hereto), 
reciting that "[t]here is no evidence that . . . any Kennecott 
employee had knowledge of any condition or structure on the 
property dangerous enough that the probable result of contact with 
that condition or structure would have been serious injury" and 
that "[t]here is no evidence that any Kennecott employee willfully 
or maliciously failed to guard or warn against any dangerous 
condition or structure on the property." 
Both the Slip Opinion and the findings of the trial court 
ignore Loosli's right to a jury trial on that issue. 
A. Every Factual Question Must Be Decided By A Jury. 
Loosli formally demanded jury trial, not once but twice. Rule 
38(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declares that the right of 
trial by jury shall be preserved to the parties. Nevertheless, 
the trial judge weighed the evidence, found it insufficient and 
then ruled that "Plaintiff's Motion for a Trial by Jury is deemed 
moot and is, therefore, hereby denied" (see Rulings on Pending 
Motions, etc., R. 892, attached as an Appendix hereto at %3), 
thereby invading the province of the jury. This Court magnified 
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the trial judge's error, acknowledging that Loosli had made a 
factual showing through an accident reconstruction expert, but 
then proceeding to weigh the evidence and hold it lacking. 
The allegation of a willful failure to guard or warn is a jury 
question under landowner liability statutes which cannot be dis-
posed of as a matter of law. Mandell v. United States, 719 F.2d 
963 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying Arkansas law). Accord., Bier v. 
New Philadelphia, 11 Ohio St.3d 134, 464 N.E.2d 147 (1986) 
(summary judgment reversed, defendant may be liable for failure to 
install lightning protection on a park shelter). Such holdings 
are an aspect of the proposition frequently stated by this court 
that summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. E.g. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon 
County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Slip Opinion thus ignores the square holding of this Court 
that questions concerning discharge of any standard of care are 
uniquely for the trier of fact and not susceptible to ruling as a 
matter of law. E.g., Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 
825 (Utah App. 1989): 
As a general proposition, summary judgment is 
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on 
its merits, and should be employed "only in the 
most clearcut case." Of particular concern 
is the precept that "[o]rdinarily, whether a 
defendant has breached the required standard of 
care is a question of fact for the jury." 
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate 
unless the applicable standard of care is "fixed 
by law," and reasonable minds could reach but 
one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence 
under the circumstances. Furthermore, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that since summary 
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disposition denies the losing party "the 
privilege of a trial," art. I, § 11 of the Utah 
Constitution suggests that "doubt or uncertainty 
as to the questions of negligence . . . should 
be resolved in favor of granting . . . a 
trial." (Citations omitted.) 
This Court held in Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah 
App. 1991), that the closely related question of the landowner's 
duty to guard or warn under Restatement §17.2 is uniquely a 
question of fact for the jury: 
In this case, the foreseeability issue 
boils down to a question of reasonableness. To 
what extent would a prudent landowner reason-
ably inspect the premises prior to parting with 
possession? . . . . 
Ordinarily, such questions of reasonable-
ness necessarily pose questions of fact which 
should be reserved for jury resolution and, 
except in the clearest cases, should not be 
disposed of by summary judgment. Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 727-28 (Utah 1985); 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). This is only an aspect of 
the general rule that "summary judgment should 
be granted with great caution when negligence is 
alleged." See English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 
1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Otherwise "far 
too many issues [would be removed] from the 
jury's consideration." Sharp v. W.H. Moore, 
Inc., 796 P.2d at 510. Therefore, 
summary judgment is [generally] inappro-
priate to resolve a negligence claim on 
its merits, and should be employed "only 
in the most clear cut case" . . . [where] 
the applicable standard of care is "fixed 
by law," and reasonable minds could reach 
but one conclusion as to the defendant's 
negligence under the circumstances. . . . 
[Any] "doubt or uncertainty as to the 
questions of negligence . . . should be 
resolved in favor of granting a trial." 
812 P.2d at 459 (citations omitted). 
To the same effect, the Supreme Court held in Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982), that summary 
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judgment is "appropriate in negligence cases . • . only in the 
most clear-cut case" for the reason that matters such as 
inspection of the road sign in the River ton City case, and 
whether the defendant "should, and if so could, have responded 
more effectively and quickly is a matter for trial" Id. at 437. 
The question of whether Kennecott discharged its duty under 
Section 6 and Restatement §17.2 is thus for the jury, for 
"weighing evidence is proper only when making findings of fact, 
not when determining questions of law . . . on a motion for 
summary judgment." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 
1991). See also, Busch v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 743 
P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987). 
The Slip Opinion thus errs. The standard of care under the 
Act is not "fixed by statute," unless this Court is prepared to 
memorialize, in a published opinion, the holding of the trial 
court that mere invitation to others to use the Lark Sand Dunes 
invokes the "no duty of care" provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
57-14-4. That holding is plain error, for it reads the exception 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-6, which the Slip Opinion 
acknowledges at p. 4, out of the Act entirely. 
B. The Slip Opinion Ignores Multiple Fact Questions, 
Loosli's showing that Kennecott knew of the protruding timbers 
at the Lark Sand Dunes was undisputed (see Brief of Appellant pp. 
36-37). Indeed, the Slip Opinion recites at p. 2 that there were 
such obstructions and at p. 6 that Loosli presented the affidavit 
of an expert on accident reconstruction (R. 704) that the accident 
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could not have occurred without contact with such an obstruction. 
Those matters, standing alone, present a clear factual issue which 
cannot properly be taken from the jury* 
In addition, three witnesses [viz., Plaintiff and his son, 
Adam Loosli, and the Park Ranger, Mr. McKowen], each of whose 
depositions were ordered published by the trial court, testified 
that there were numerous timbers or posts protruding at the site 
of the accident. Moreover, Loosli presented photographs and maps 
showing protrusions at the accident site, the Affidavit of LeRoy 
Peterson (R. 701) that the accident occurred near the projecting 
timbers and the affidavits submitted in support of Kennecott/s 
Motion further support Loosli's showing to the extent that they 
acknowledge that Kennecott was aware of considerable "debris" at 
the Lark Sand Dunes. 
The Slip Opinion errs to the extent that it ignores Loosli's 
showing in that regard. It was agreed that Kennecott had not 
warned Loosli or any other recreational user of the Lark Sand 
Dunes of the projecting timbers. A jury might conclude that the 
"debris" consisted of the protruding remains of Kennecott's mining 
facilities and that they were inherently dangerous. 
C. The Slip Opinion Fails to Address Striking of Plaintiff's 
Showing. 
The Slip Opinion further errs by failing to reverse, or 
address in any way, the trial court's order purporting to strike 
Loosli's showing of disputed material facts by way of affidavits, 
maps and photographs showing the projecting timbers. 
The trial court ordered Loosli's affidavits, R. 701, 704, 
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filed, but simultaneously stricken, then declared that topographic 
maps of the Lark Sand Dunes, R. 781, showing the projections at 
the site of the accident had been considered as part of the 
arguments on the motions, but that "the Court finds that the 
exhibits need not be retained as if they had become a part of the 
evidentiary record and, therefore, denies the motion [for leave to 
file them]." (See Rulings on Pending Motions, Appendix % 6.) 
Such rulings misconceive summary judgment procedure and assume 
that a motion for summary judgment must be resisted with 
"evidence." To the contrary, Rule 56(e) contemplates only that 
there be a showing; 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
The United States Supreme Court's trilogy of opinions in 1986 
dispel any notion that "evidence" is required under the identical 
provisions of federal Rule 56. See, Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986); 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242 (1986). In Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987), 
this Court adopted both Anderson v. Liberty Lobby and Celotex. 
The Slip Opinion ignores those precepts and commits 
fundamental error. Loosli clearly met his burden by producing 
depositions and affidavits, which are the very vehicles 
contemplated by the Rule to make the required showing. The trial 
judge's ruling that the topographic maps were considered, but are 
not "a part of the evidentiary record" and the court "therefore, 
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denies the motion" to file them only compounds the error. Maps 
are self-authenticating under Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-6. 
Considering the standard on review of a summary judgment, it 
is both futile and sham to order the affidavits and topographic 
maps filed and considered for the Rule 56 hearing, but stricken 
for purposes of appeal. The Slip Opinion errs by ruling that 
Loosli failed to meet his burden of a "showing" of disputed facts 
without considering the matters presented in the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, rehearing should be granted to 
consider all of the issues presented for review, none of which were 
considered or decided by the Slip Opinion. 
This Court should construe Section 6, in the context of a lease 
for purposes involving public use, to require showing of a 
dangerous condition and a willful, or intentional failure to guard 
or warn. Those issues were extensively briefed in Brief of 
Appellant, which arguments cannot be repeated in this Petition. 
This Court should, therefore, order reconsideration of that 
important question of first impression. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of March, 1993. 
.&?/^ ^  ^ ^ 
jL ^ v ''*~ """ ' ^-"^^^ 
Glen M. Richman, Esq. 
Parker M. Nielson, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
(0682) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
EDWARD LOOSLI, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
a New York corporation 
KENNECOTT MINING CORP., a 
New York corporation, and 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
RULINGS ON PENDING MOTIONS, 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 900901012PI 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
* * * * * * * * 
Cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff 
and Defendants in this matter came on for hearing under a special 
setting before the Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, 
on Friday, July 19, 1991. The Court, having considered the sev-
eral memoranda submitted by both parties, having ordered publica-
tion of the depositions from the bench on the stipulation of 
counsel, having heard the argument of counsel, and having 
A P P E N D I X 
considered the matter, made findings of fact and conclusions of 
lav, and entered an order granting defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denying plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
On August 12, 1991, after the order was entered, Plain-
tiff filed a Motion for New Trial and a memorandum in support of 
that motion. In those pleadings, Plaintiff moved for a new trial 
on the issues resolved in the order and in the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposi-
tion to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, The Court denied 
Plaintiff's motion through a minute entry dated October 24, 1991. 
Additionally, by way of a pleading titled Plaintiff's 
Notice to Submit for Decision and correspondence to Judge Brian 
dated August 20, 1991, and October 31f 1991, plaintiff's counsel 
requested that the Court rule on motions pending in this matter 
at the time the Court entered its referenced summary judgment 
orders. The Court originally chose not to rule on the pending 
matters believing they were moot. However, in response to the 
request of plaintiff's counsel, this Court held a telephonic con-
ference on November 4, 1991, during which plaintiff's counsel 
again requested that the Court rule on all pending motions. 
During the course of this litigation, the parties have 
filed numerous pleadings both in support of and in opposition to 
the pending motions. The Court has reviewed these pleadings 
which include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: 
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Motion to Dismiss a Party Plaintiff and for Trial by Jury; 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Delete a Party Plain-
tiff and for Trial by Jury; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Trial 
by Jury; 
Plaintiff's Responsive Memorandum to Defendant's Motion to 
Strike Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint and Defen-
dant's [sic] in Opposition to Plaintiff's Demand for Trial 
by Jury; 
Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Complaint and Answer to Kennecott's Motion to 
Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand; 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's 
Cross Motion for Pretrial Summary Judgment; 
Motion to Strike Portions of Defendants' Affidavits; 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of 
Defendants' Affidavits; 
Defendants' Consolidated Memorandum; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Portions of 
Defendants' Affidavits; 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment; 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint; 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to 
File Amended Complaint; 
Amended Complaint; 
Kennecott's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and 
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in Support of Kennecott's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's 
Jury Demand; 
Kennecott's Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and 
in Support of Kennecott's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's 
Jury Demand; 
Motion to File and Publish Deposition of Charles Stillman; 
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand; 
Plaintiff's Reply to Kennecott's Supplemental Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaitiff's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
Motion for Leave to File Affidavit of Leroy Peterson; 
Motion for Leave to File Affidavit of Dr. V. Morfopoulos; 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Leroy Petersen 
and Vassilis Morfopoulos; 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Affidavits; 
Motion for Leave to File for Illustrative Purposes, Topo-
graphic Maps of the Lark Sand Dunes; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave for Illustra-
tive Purposes, Topographic Maps of the Lark Sand Dunes; 
and 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Leave to File, for Illustrative Purposes, 
Topographical Maps of the Lark Sand Dunes. 
To achieve finality in this case, the Court, having 
reviewed the above listed pleadings and having reviewed the rele-
vant law, makes the following: 
RULINGS ON PENDING MOTIONS 
1. Plaintiff's Motions for Leave to File Affidavits 
of LeRoy Peterson and Dr. Morfopoulos are hereby granted. 
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2. Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavits of 
LeRoy Peterson and Dr. Morfopoulos is hereby granted. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion For a Trial by Jury is deemed 
moot and isf therefore, hereby denied. 
4. Plaintiff's Motion to File Amended Complaint is 
hereby granted, but, in light of the Court's ruling on the 
motions for summary judgment, an answer thereto would be moot and 
thus, the Court rules that defendant shall have no obligation to 
respond or otherwise answer the Amended Complaint, and, in light 
of the Court's order denying the motion for jury trial, the Court 
orders that the request for jury trial made by plaintiff in the 
Amended Complaint is also denied. 
5. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Portions of Defen-
dants' Affidavits is hereby denied. 
6. With respect to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to 
File, for Illustrative Purposes, Topographic Maps of the Lark 
Sand Dunes, the Court notes that these exhibits were offered for 
illustrative purposes only and the Court considered them as part 
of the arguments on the motions for summary judgment. However, 
not having been offered as part of the evidentiary record, the 
Court finds that the exhibits need not be retained as if they had 
become a part of the evidentiary record and, therefore, denies 
the motion. 
7. Defendants' Motion to File and Publish Deposition 
of Charles Stillman is deemed moot by virtue of the Court's 
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previous ruling from the bench ordering published all depositions 
taken in the case but nonetheless is hereby granted. 
Based on the Court's review of the record and having 
ruled on the pending motions, the Court reaffirms the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law which it entered on August 1, 1991, 
and enters an amended order. In doing so, the Court has reviewed 
and considered the arguments set forth in both parties' pleadings 
addressing the relevant issues, as well as the allegations of 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
The Court, therefore, now reaffirms its findings of 
fact by entering the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Kennecott owns a parcel of real property in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, commonly referred to as the Lark Sand 
Dunes. 
2. From August 1, 1977, to December 31, 1989, the 
property was under lease to the State of Utah, Division of Parks 
and Recreation, by Kennecott. 
3. There is a great demand for lands of this type for 
recreational use. 
4. The Lease Agreement recited that the property was 
to be used in conjunction with the State's recreational vehicle 
program. 
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5. The State made the leased property available to 
the public as a site for off-road recreational vehicle use and 
neither Kennecott nor the State collected any fees or tolls from 
recreational vehicle users, including Mr. Loosli, at the Lark 
Sand Dunes. 
6. Prior to opening the Lark Sand Dunes, the State, 
with the assistance of volunteers, used equipment to clean up 
debris and to level out the terrain at various areas, and the 
State had an ongoing program to look for and to clean up debris. 
7. More than ten years after Kennecott turned the 
property over to the State for its off-road recreational vehicle 
use program, Mr. Loosli, on April 29, 1988, entered the property 
for the purpose of operating a three-wheeled all-terrain recre-
ational vehicle. 
8. While riding the vehicle on the property, Mr. 
Loosli had an accident which resulted in personal injury. 
9. Mr. Loosli does not know what caused the accident. 
10. There were no witnesses to the accident. 
11. There is no evidence that at the time the lease 
was executed or during the term of the lease any Kennecott 
employee had knowledge of any condition or structure on the prop-
erty dangerous enough that the probable result of contact with 
that condition or structure would have been serious injury. 
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12. There is no evidence that any Kennecott employee 
willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against any dan-
gerous condition or structure on the property. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now reaffirms its 
previously entered conclusions of law by entering the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To encourage public and private landowners to make 
their land available to the public for recreational purposes, the 
State of Utah limits the liability of landowners towards persons 
entering the land for recreational purposes. S 57-14-1, Utah 
Code Ann* 
2. Kennecott is an "owner" of "land" known as the 
Lark Sand Dunes as those terms are defined in S 57-14-2, Utah 
Code Ann. 
3. Kennecott leased the Lark Sand Dunes to the State 
of Utah for a "recreational purpose" as that term is defined in S 
57-14-2, Utah Code Ann. 
4. Kennecott did not "charge" an admission price or 
fee to any person to enter the Lark Sand Dunes as that term is 
defined in S 57-14-2, Utah Code Ann. 
5. Plaintiff is a "person" as that term is defined in 
S 57-14-2, Utah Code Ann. 
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6. The Utah Limitation of Landowner Liability Actf 
codified at Utah Code Ann. S 57-14-1, et sea, applies to and con-
trols the resolution of this action. 
7. Kennecott had no duty of care to keep the premises 
safe for entry by Plaintiff or to give any warning of a dangerous 
condition, use, structure, or activity on its premises to 
Plaintiff. 
8. Kennecott is protected from liability for Plain-
tiff's injuries pursuant to the provisions of S 57-14-4, Utah 
Code Ann. 
9. Kennecott did not willfully or maliciously fail to 
guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or 
activity so as to bring it within the exception of S 
57-14-6(1)(a), Utah Code Ann. 
10. Therefore, under the terms of the Utah Limitation 
of Landowner Liability Act, Kennecott has no liability to Plain-
tiff for any injuries described in this action. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the Court now hereby enters the following: 
AMENDED ORDER 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
denied. 
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted. 
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3e Plaintifffs Complaint as well as Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint and each cause of action stated in each of them 
are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, no cause of action. 
4. Plaintifffs Motion for New Trial is hereby denied. 
5. Each party shall bear its own costs incurred in 
this matter to date. 
lis DATED th ^x^^ day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
PAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT COURT 
Prior to execution by the Court, this Rulings on Pend-
ing Motions, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order was reviewed by Parker M. Neilson, attorney for plaintiff, 
who concurs in its form on this day of December, 1991. 
BARKER M. NEILSON 
JMB:110991A 
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